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A policy  issue central banks are confronted with is whether inflation targets should be adjusted to
account for the systematic upward  bias in measured inflation due to quality improvements in consumption
goods.  We show that in the context of a Ramsey equilibrium  the answer to this question depends
on what prices are assumed to be sticky. If nonquality-adjusted prices are assumed to be  sticky, then
the Ramsey plan predicts that  the inflation target should not be corrected. If, on the other hand, quality-adjusted
(or hedonic)  prices are assumed to be sticky, then the Ramsey plan calls for raising the inflation target
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The existence of a positive quality bias in the consumer price index has led some to argue that
an inﬂation target equal in size to the bias would be appropriate if the ultimate objective
of the central bank is price stability. In this paper, we critically evaluate this argument.
Speciﬁcally, we study whether a central bank implementing Ramsey-optimal policy should
adjust its inﬂation target to account for the systematic upward bias in measured inﬂation due
to quality improvements in consumption goods. We show that the answer to this question
depends critically on what prices are assumed to be sticky. If nonquality-adjusted prices are
assumed to be sticky, then according to the Ramsey policy the inﬂation target should not
be corrected. If, on the other hand, quality-adjusted (or hedonic) prices are assumed to be
sticky, then the inﬂation target should be raised by the magnitude of the bias.
In June 1995, the Senate Finance Committee appointed an advisory commission com-
posed of ﬁve prominent economists (Michael Boskin, Ellen Dulberger, Robert Gordon, Zvi
Griliches, and Dale Jorgenson) to study the magnitude of the measurement error in the
consumer price index. The commission concluded that over the period 1995-1996, the U.S.
CPI had an upward bias of 1.1 percent per year. Of the total bias, 0.6 percent was ascribed
to unmeasured quality improvements (see Boskin et al., 1996). To illustrate the nature of
the quality bias, consider the case of a personal computer. Suppose that between 1995 and
1996 the nominal price of a computer increased by 2 percent. Assume also that during this
period the quality of personal computers, measured by attributes such as memory, process-
ing speed, and video capabilities, increased signiﬁcantly. If the statistical oﬃce in charge of
constructing the consumer price index did not adjust the price index for quality improve-
ment, then it would report two percent inﬂation in personal computers. However, because
a personal computer in 1996 provides more services than does a personal computer in 1995,
the quality-adjusted rate of inﬂation in personal computers should be recorded as lower than
two percent. The diﬀerence between the reported rate of inﬂation and the quality-adjusted
rate of inﬂation is called the quality bias in measured inﬂation.
We analyze the relationship between a quality bias in measured inﬂation and the Ramsey-
optimal rate of inﬂation in the context of a neo-Keynesian model with Calvo (1983) and Yun
(1996) price staggering. The key modiﬁcation we introduce to that framework is that the
quality of consumption goods is assumed to increase over time. This modiﬁcation gives rise
to an inﬂation bias if the statistical agency in charge of constructing the consumer price
index fails to take quality improvements into account. The central question we entertain
in the present study is whether under Ramsey optimal policy the inﬂation target should be
adjusted by the presence of this bias.
The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections. Section 2 presents a simple
neo-Keynesian model of quality bias in measured inﬂation. Section 3 characterizes Ramsey-
optimal monetary policy when nonquality-adjusted prices are assumed to be sticky. Section 4
characterizes Ramsey-optimal monetary policy when quality-adjusted (or hedonic) prices are
assumed to be sticky. Section 5 concludes.
12 A Simple Model of Quality Bias
In this section, we build a model of price staggering ` a la Calvo-Yun augmented to allow for
quality improvement in consumption goods.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a large number of households with preferences deﬁned over
a continuum of goods of measure one indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Each unit of good i sells for
Pit dollars in period t. We denote the quantity of good i purchased by the representative
consumer in period t by cit. The quality of good i is denoted by xit and is assumed to evolve








where η>1 denotes the elasticity of substitution across diﬀerent good varieties. Note that
the utility of the household increases with the quality content of each good. Let at denote
the amount of the composite good the household wishes to consume in period t. Then, the























denotes the quality-adjusted (or hedonic) price of good i, and Qt is a quality-adjusted (or









The price index Qt has the property that the total cost of at units of composite good is given
by Qtat, that is,
R 1
0 Pitcitdi = Qtat. Because at is the object from which households derive
utility, it follows from this property that Qt, the unit price of at, represents the appropriate
measure of the cost of living.
2Households supply labor eﬀort to the market for a nominal wage rate Wt and are assumed
to have access to a complete set of ﬁnancial assets. Their budget constraint is given by
Qtat + Etrt,t+1Dt+1 + Tt = Dt + Wtht +Φ t,
where rt,t+j is a discount factor deﬁned so that the dollar price in period t of any random
nominal payment Dt+j in period t + j is given by Etrt,t+jDt+j. The variable Φt denotes
nominal proﬁts received from the ownership of ﬁrms, and the variable Tt denotes lump-sum
taxes.






where the period utility function U is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly con-
cave, and the subjective discount factor β lies in the interval (0,1). The household chooses
processes {at,h t,D t+1} to maximize this utility function subject to the sequential budget con-
straint and a no-Ponzi-game restriction of the form limj→∞Etrt,t+jDt+j ≥ 0. The optimality
conditions associated with the household’s problem are the sequential budget constraint, the















Each intermediate consumption good i ∈ [0,1] is produced by a monopolistically compet-
itive ﬁrm via a linear production function zthit, where hit denotes labor input used in the
production of good i, and zt is an aggregate productivity shock. Proﬁts of ﬁrm i in period t
are given by
Pitcit − Wthit(1 − τ),
where τ denotes a subsidy per unit of labor received from the government. This subsidy is
introduced so that under ﬂexible prices the monopolistic ﬁrm would produce the competitive
level of output. In this way, the only distortion remaining in the model is the one associated
with sluggish price adjustment. While this assumption, which is customary in the neo-
Keynesian literature, greatly facilitates the characterization of optimal monetary policy, it
is not crucial in deriving the main results of this paper.
The ﬁrm must satisfy demand at posted prices. Formally, this requirement gives rise to
the restriction
zthit ≥ cit,






xit. Let MCit denote the Lagrange
multiplier on the above constraint. Then, the optimality condition of the ﬁrm’s problem
with respect to labor is given by
(1 − τ)Wt = MCitzt.
It is clear from this ﬁrst-order condition that MCit must be identical across ﬁrms. We
therefore drop the subscript i from this variable.
Consider now the price setting problem of the monopolistically competitive ﬁrm. For
the purpose of determining the optimal inﬂation target, it is crucial to be precise in regard
to what prices are assumed to be costly to adjust. We distinguish two cases. In one case
we assume that nonquality-adjusted prices, Pit, are sticky. In the second case, we assume
that quality-adjusted (or hedonic) prices, Qit, are sticky. Using again the example of the
personal computer, the case of stickiness in nonquality-adjusted prices would correspond to
a situation in which the price of the personal computer is costly to adjust. The case of
stickiness in quality-adjusted prices results when the price of a computer per unit of quality
is sticky, where in our example quality would be measured by an index capturing attributes
such as memory, processing speed, video capabilities, etc.. We consider ﬁrst the case in
which stickiness occurs at the level of nonquality-adjusted prices.
3 Stickiness in Nonquality-Adjusted Prices
Suppose that with probability α ﬁrm i ∈ [0,1] cannot reoptimize its price, Pit, in a given
period. Consider the price-setting problem of a ﬁrm that has the chance to reoptimize its
price in period t. Let ˜ Pit be the price chosen by such ﬁrm. The portion of the Lagrangian as-
sociated with the ﬁrm’s optimization problem that is relevant for the purpose of determining

































Although we believe that the case of greatest empirical interest is one in which quality
varies across goods, maintaining such assumption complicates the aggregation of the model,
as it adds another source of heterogeneity in addition to the familiar price dispersion stem-
ming from Calvo-Yun staggering. Consequently, to facilitate aggregation, we assume that all
goods are of the same quality, that is, we assume that xit = xt for all i. We further simplify
the exposition by assuming that xt grows at the constant rate κ>0, that is,
xt =( 1+κ)xt−1.

































It is clear from these expressions that all ﬁrms that have the chance to reoptimize their price
in a given period will choose the same price. We therefore drop the subscript i from the
variable ˜ Pit. We also note that the deﬁnitions of Pt and ct imply that Ptct =
R 1
0 Pitcitdi. Thus
Pt can be interpreted as the consumer price index unadjusted for quality improvements.
The aggregate price level Pt is related to the reoptimized price ˜ Pt by the following familiar





t−1 +( 1− α) ˜ P
1−η
t .

























di, we can write the aggregate resource con-
straint as
ztht = stct,
where st ≥ 1 measures the degree of price dispersion in the economy and can be shown to
obey the law of motion





where ˜ pt ≡ ˜ Pt/Pt denotes the relative price of goods whose price was reoptimized in period
t, and πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 denotes the gross rate of inﬂation in period t not adjusted for quality
improvements.








ztht = stct, (2)








































given exogenous processes zt and xt, a policy regime πt, and the initial condition s−1.W e
assume that s−1 = 1, so that there is no inherited price dispersion in period 0. The variable
mct ≡ MCt/Pt denotes the marginal cost of production in terms of the composite good ct.
We next establish that the optimal monetary policy consists in constant nonquality-
adjusted prices. This policy coincides with the one that would be Ramsey optimal in the
absence of quality improvements. That is, we show that when nonquality-adjusted prices
are sticky, the Ramsey optimal monetary policy calls for not incorporating the quality bias
into the inﬂation target. To this end, set πt = 1 for all t and 1 − τ =( η − 1)/η. Then,
by equation (4) ˜ pt = 1 for all t and by (3) st = 1 for all t. Letting mct =( η − 1)/η, it is
easy to very that equation (4) is satisﬁed. Equilibrium conditions (1) and (2) then become
identical to those associated with the problem of maximizing E0
P∞
t=0 βtU(xtct,h t), subject
to ztht = ct. We have therefore demonstrated that setting πt equal to unity is not only
Ramsey optimal but also Pareto eﬃcient.
Importantly, πt is the rate of inﬂation that results from measuring prices without ad-
justing for quality improvement. The inﬂation rate that takes into account improvements
in the quality of goods is given by Qt/Qt−1, which equals πt/(1 + κ) and is less than πt by
our maintained assumption that quality improves over time at the rate κ>0. Therefore,
although there is a quality bias in the measurement of inﬂation, given by the rate of quality
improvement κ, the central bank should not target a positive rate of inﬂation.
This result runs contrary to the usual argument that in the presence of a quality bias in
the aggregate price level, the central bank should adjust its inﬂation target upwards by the
magnitude of the quality bias. For instance, suppose that, in line with the ﬁndings of the
Boskin Commission, the quality bias in the rate of inﬂation was 0.6 percent (or κ =0 .006).
Then, the conventional wisdom would suggest that the central bank target a rate of inﬂation
of about 0.6 percent. We have shown, however, that such policy would be suboptimal.
Rather, optimal policy calls for a zero inﬂation target. The key to understanding this result
is to identify exactly which prices are sticky. For optimal policy aims at keeping the price
of goods that are sticky constant over time to avoid ineﬃcient price dispersion. Here we
are assuming that stickiness originates in non-quality adjusted prices. Therefore, optimal
policy consists in keeping these prices constant over time. At the same time, because quality-
adjusted (or hedonic) prices are ﬂexible, the monetary authority lets them decline at the rate
κ without creating distortions.
Suppose now that the statistical agency responsible for constructing the consumer price
index decided to correct the index to reﬂect quality improvements. For example, in response
to the publication of the Boskin Commission report, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
reinforced its use of hedonic prices in the construction of the CPI (Gordon, 2006). In
the ideal case in which all of the quality bias is eliminated from the CPI, the statistical
6Table 1: The Optimal Rate of Inﬂation under Quality Bias
Statistical Agency
Corrects Quality Bias
Stickiness in No Yes
Nonquality-Adjusted Prices 0 −κ
Quality-Adjusted (or Hedonic) Prices κ 0
Note. The parameter κ>0 denotes the rate of quality improvement.
agency would publish data on Qt rather than on Pt. How should the central bank adjust
its inﬂation target in response to this methodological advancement? The goal of the central
bank continues to be the complete stabilization of the nonquality-adjusted price, Pt, for this
is the price that suﬀers from stickiness. To achieve this goal, the published price index, Qt,
would have to be falling at the rate of quality improvement, κ. This means that the central
bank would have to target deﬂation at the rate κ.
To summarize, when nonquality-adjusted prices are sticky, the optimal inﬂation target
of the central bank is either zero (when the statistical agency does not correct the price
index for quality improvements) or negative at the rate of quality improvement (when the
statistical agency does correct the price index for quality improvements). See table 1.
4 Stickiness in Quality-Adjusted Prices
Assume now that quality-adjusted (or hedonic) prices, Qit, are costly to adjust. Consider
the price-setting problem of a ﬁrm, i say, that has the chance to reoptimize Qit in period t.
Let ˜ Qit be the quality-adjusted price chosen by such ﬁrm. The portion of the Lagrangian
associated with the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem that is relevant for the purpose of






























A competitive equilibrium in the economy with stickiness in quality-adjusted prices is a


























































given exogenous processes zt and xt, a policy regime πt, and the initial condition s−1.A s
before, we assume no initial dispersion of relative prices by setting s−1 =1 .
We wish to demonstrate that when quality-adjusted prices are sticky, the optimal rate of
inﬂation is positive and equal to the rate of quality improvement, κ. Setting πt = xt/xt−1,w e
have that in the competitive equilibrium ˜ pt = 1 and st = 1 for all t. Assuming further that
the ﬁscal authority sets 1 − τ =( η − 1)/η, we have that the set of competitive equilibrium
conditions becomes identical to the set of optimality conditions associated with the social
planner’s problem of maximizing E0
P∞
t=0 βtU(xtct,h t), subject to ztht = ct.
We have therefore proven that when quality-adjusted prices are sticky, a positive inﬂation
target equal to the rate of quality improvement (πt =1+κ) is Ramsey optimal and Pareto
eﬃcient. In this case, the optimal adjustment in the inﬂation target conforms to the con-
ventional wisdom, according to which the quality bias in inﬂation measurement justiﬁes an
upward correction of the inﬂation target equal in size to the bias itself. The intuition behind
this result is that in order to avoid relative price dispersion, the monetary authority must
engineer a policy whereby ﬁrms have no incentives to change prices that are sticky. In the
case considered here the prices that are sticky happen to be the quality-adjusted prices. At
the same time, non-quality adjusted prices are fully ﬂexible and therefore under the optimal
policy they are allowed to grow at the rate κ without creating ineﬃciencies.
Finally, suppose that the statistical agency in charge of preparing the consumer price
index decided to correct the quality bias built into the price index. In this case, the central
bank should revise its inﬂation target downward to zero in order to accomplish its goal of
price stability in (sticky) quality-adjusted prices. The second row of table 1 summarizes the
results of this section.
5 Conclusion
We interpret the results derived in this paper as suggesting that if the case of greatest
empirical relevance is one in which nonquality-adjusted prices (the price of the personal
computer in the example we have been using throughout) is sticky, then the conventional
wisdom that quality bias justiﬁes an upward adjustment in the inﬂation target is misplaced.
Applying this conclusion to the case of the United States, it would imply that no fraction of
the 2 percent inﬂation target implicit in Fed policy is justiﬁable on the basis of the quality bias
in the U.S. consumer price index. Moreover, the corrective actions taken by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics in response to the ﬁndings of the Boskin commission, including new hedonic
8indexes for television sets and personal computers as well as an improved treatment-based
methodology for measuring medical care prices, would, according to the Ramsey plan, justify
setting negative inﬂation targets. If, on the other hand, the more empirically relevant case
is the one in which hedonic prices are sticky, then the conventional view that the optimal
inﬂation target should be adjusted upward by the size of the quality bias is indeed consistent
with the predictions of our model. The central empirical question raised by the theoretical
analysis presented in this paper is therefore whether regular or hedonic prices are more sticky.
The existing empirical literature on nominal price rigidities has yet to address this matter.
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